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Abstract
This chapter in a forthcoming book justifies the conventional characterization of
common-law agency as a fiduciary relationship. An agent serves as the principal’s
representative in dealings with third parties and facts about the world, situating the
agent as an extension of the principal for legally-salient purposes. A principal’s power
to furnish instructions to the agent is the fundamental mechanism through which the
principal exercises control over the agent, a requisite for an agency relationship. The
agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal provides a benchmark for the agent’s
interpretation of those instructions. The chapter draws on philosophical literature on
the identity of the self over time to address related characteristics of agency doctrine,
including the agent’s duty to interpret instructions and statements of authority in light of
the principal’s present wishes as the agent reasonably understands them as well as the
principal’s ongoing power to revoke the agent’s authority even when the revocation
constitutes a breach of contract.
1.

Introduction
Disputes that turn on the application of agency law often involve situations in which,

notwithstanding an agent’s foibles, the principal is legally responsible for the agent’s actions.

*

David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. I served as the
Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Agency, completed in 2006. Some arguments and
examples in this chapter originated in the Restatement project or in my unpublished paper,
“Instructions and the Agency Relationship,” discussed in Kent Greenawalt, Legal
Interpretation: Perspectives from Other Disciplines and Private Texts (New York: Oxford
University Press 2010). Thanks to Professor Greenawalt for his reactions.
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Agency doctrine grounds the principal’s responsibility in the principal’s right or power to
control the agent. The principal’s fundamental mechanism of control, which may be
supplemented by others, is the provision of instructions to the agent, either initially when
stating the actions the agent has authority to take on the principal’s behalf or thereafter
throughout the duration of their relationship.1 This chapter focuses on how the agent should
interpret those instructions. The agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal furnishes a benchmark
for interpretation and for assessing actions the agent takes in response. The fiduciary
benchmark requires the agent to interpret instructions reasonably in light of the principal’s
wishes as the agent understands them when the agent must decide what action to take, a
temporal focus for interpretation that is distinctive to agency relationships. The fiduciary
benchmark does not permit the agent to exploit gaps or arguable ambiguities in the principal’s
instructions to further the agent’s self-interest or that of a third party, without the principal’s
consent. The foundational importance of control in defining agency,2 and the centrality of
instructions to control, make agency distinctive as a common-law subject, in particular
distinguishing it from other categories (e.g. trusts) conventionally treated as fiduciary.
Accounts of agency law that ignore or slight the importance of instructions are incomplete

1

More formally defined, an instruction specifies “how [an] authorized person is to
exercise the power conferred.” Scott J. Shapiro, Legality 228 (Cambridge & London: Harvard
University Press 2011). Collapsing instructions and initial statements of authority is consistent
with common-law agency doctrine.
2
Formally stated, “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (the
‘principal’) manifests consent to another person (the ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1
(St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers 2007).
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because they fail to explain either well-settled doctrine or hard-to-miss facts about how agency
relationships function.
Focusing on an agent’s interpretation of instructions received from the principal also
explains the relative weakness of agency as a mechanism through which a person might bind
herself prospectively regardless of future changes in external circumstances or in the
principal’s own preferences. A principal’s power to terminate an agent’s authority or
countermand prior instructions stems from the representational character of an agency
relationship—remaining a separate person, an agent also functions as an extension of the
principal as a legally-salient person—as well from the principal’s inability to foresee shifts in
the agent’s motivations and, more generally, how the agent may act in the future. Although
agency doctrine does not treat the principal as personally discontinuous over time, it also does
not privilege the principal’s prior preferences or intentions over those that the agent reasonably
understands the principal presently to have at the time the agent determines how to act. How
the agent should understand the principal’s instructions is contingent on circumstances when
the agent must determine the action to take and on an honest assessment of what the principal
would then wish the agent to do. This assessment has a subjunctive quality—as the principal’s
representative, the agent should aim to act “as if” the principal personally had taken action and
as the principal “would have” acted—which suffices to fulfill the agent’s duty although the
principal has not, as a matter of historical fact, specifically “consented” to the agent’s action.
And, acting as the principal’s extension, the agent’s duty is one of faithful interpretation,
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aimed at accurate replication of how the principal would have acted at the time the agent
determines what to do3
To develop these arguments, the chapter proceeds through a series of examples testing an
agent’s interpretation of instructions against the fiduciary benchmark: categorically-stated
instructions that are nonetheless incomplete; instructions that explicitly confer discretion on the
agent; instructions conferring authority given after the agent acts; and instructions that
countermand prior instructions or withdraw authority altogether. A cumulative discussion of
other two other accounts of agency doctrine follows, with an assessment of their implications
for how agents should interpret instructions.
2.

The Categorical But Incomplete Instruction
Most statements of authority and interim instructions are incomplete in one way or

another in specifying what the agent should and should not do, distinct from explicit conferrals
of discretion on the agent. Although conduct may express meaning without using words, as
when a principal points to a painting that the agent should attempt to buy for the principal at an
auction, this chapter focuses on verbal expression, which is typical of accounts of legal
interpretation. To be sure, not all instructions require interpretation in the sense of raising real
doubts what the principal means; the world of agency relationships requires a more workaday
understanding of language than one that treats all expressive conduct as requiring interpretation

3

Agency exemplifies a private-law institution that furthers a principal’s autonomy.
Among its distinguishing characteristics are doctrines enabling a form of self-authorship that is
subject to ongoing revision when the principal so wishes. On autonomy-enhancing institutions,
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because doubts are always possible.4 Nonetheless, although a principal’s instruction raises no
real doubt as to its meaning as a semantic matter, the agent must always decide what to do in
response. 5 The agent’s situation, that is, raises questions even when they would not ordinarily
be characterized as ones of interpretation.
a.

Categorically-stated instructions

Consider first an instruction that on its face is categorical. P, who owns a commercial
menagerie, employs A as its manager.6 P says to A, “Buy no more horses.” If A thereafter
makes a contract in P’s name binding P to buy a horse from T, a dealer in horses, has A acted
with authority from P?7 Most likely the answer is no, but explanations are possible for A’s
purchase despite P’s direction to the contrary. First, P’s instruction, as understood by A, may
not have been as clear as P believed it to be. Lack of clarity takes different forms. Suppose P
said, instead and more colloquially, “I’m not into horses anymore.” This does not
categorically state an instruction to A, and A may understand P to be referring to preferences
and choices unrelated to the menagerie business. Separately, P’s instruction does not itself
define “horse,” which might prompt A to wonder whether P should be understood to forbid the

see H. Dagan & S. Hannes, ‘Managing Our Money: The Law of Financial Fiduciaries As a
Private Law Institution’ [in this volume, draft manuscript at 5].
4
M. Stone, ‘Theory, Practice, and Ubiquitous Interpretation: The Basics,’ Post-Modern
Sophistry: Stanley Fish and the Critical Enterprise 43, 51, 66 (Gary A. Olson & Lynn
Worsham eds.)(Albany: State University of New York Press 2004).
5
One might characterize this as a form of interpretation nonetheless, see Greenawalt,
Legal Interpretation, 223 and as consistent with Gadamer’s claim that applications of legal
norms “inevitably involve judgment and create new meaning,” id. at 161.
6
“P” and “A” are conventional schematic figures, as is “T” with whom A interacts.
7
For basic scenario in somewhat different form see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02
cmt. g.
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purchase of a pony, a zebra, or toy horses for the menagerie’s gift shop. Separately, if A has
reason to know that P uses the word “horse” idiosyncratically, that understanding of “horse”
governs A’s authority.8
b.

Changed circumstances

Second, P’s instruction does not state how absolutely or unconditionally A should
understand it. It may be necessary for A to decide what to do if circumstances change. Would
A contravene P’s instruction if A buys another horse when one presently in the menagerie
dies? That is, should A should understand P’s concern to be the menagerie’s array of species,
or, more literally and narrowly, a prohibition on purchasing horses? A might also wonder
whether P’s concern is horses as such, or whether monetary issues of relative value are
relevant as well. Suppose A has reason to believe that the horse purchased from T is worth
more than T’s asking price. If A attempts to justify the purchase to P as a bargain, P might
respond “That’s not the point. Your authority is to buy animals to exhibit, not for investment
or trading—what I own is a menagerie, not a mutual fund of animals.” Thus, A’s
understanding of P’s overall objectives is key. P may call to mind the speaker in Wittgenstein’s
well-known example who has said, “‘Shew the children a game,’” to a listener who then
teaches the children ‘gaming with dice.’”9 The speaker’s rejoinder “‘I didn’t mean that sort of
game’” may imply that the listener misunderstood either the point of the instruction or the
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Id. § 2.02, cmt. e.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 33 n. (2d ed., tr. G.E.M.
Anscombe)(New York: Macmillan 1958). Wittgenstein continues, “Must the exclusion of the
game have come before his mind when he gave me the order?” Id.
9
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speaker’s relationship with the children now educated in how to gamble with dice, or that the
listener had motives incompatible with the speaker’s known objectives.
Agents often resolve such questions by seeking clarification from the principal. Indeed, a
prudent third party would often confirm with the principal the nature and extent of an agent’s
authority. Many older agency cases involving such problems feature agents and principals
separated by physical distance and lacking effective means of rapid communication.10
However, the theoretical ability to seek and achieve clarification that modern technology
provides does not mean that such clarification always occurs. Not all agents go about their
work armed with cell phones or otherwise engaged in continual exchanges with their
principals, and an agent’s quest for clarification may, at some point, impede efficient
performance of work. Moreover, whatever the mode of contact, the agent may seek
clarification but the principal may not respond because the principal is otherwise too busy or
wishes the agent to make the decision.11 A principal may intend to respond but forget to do so;
if the principal is an organization, inadvertent slippage from prescribed routines may result in a
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E.g., Butler v. Maples, 76 U.S. 766 (1869). A related consequence of physical
distance is the principal’s inability promptly to learn that the agent has contravened
instructions, as in Short v. Skipwith, 22 F. Cas. 9, 10 (C.D. Va. 1806)(Marshall, C.J.). The
agent’s failure promptly to follow the principal’s instructions caused loss to the principal when
the market value of the investments specified by the principal rose during the interval of delay.
Short also articulates the importance of the agent’s duty to follow instructions; the agent, a friend of
the principal’s, was not a professional in investment matters. Observed the court, “[i]t certainly was
not to be expected, that a person under the circumstances of the defendant, could execute the order of
the plaintiff with the clarity and adroitness of a professional dealer in certificates; but it was to be
expected, that the orders of the plaintiff would not be disobeyed, and his remote situation increased the
obligation not altogether to neglect any part of his business.” Id. at 10. Thanks to Peter Fish for this
reference.
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failure to provide the requested clarification. The principal may attempt to respond but the
response goes astray, whether in the mail, amidst or within fax machines, or in cyberspace.
Agency doctrine protects the agent and the third party when the agent’s action is
reasonable under the circumstances, in light of the principal’s present wishes as the agent
understands them. This dimension of agency doctrine simplifies matters for the principal by
eliminating the need explicitly to update prior instructions in light of changed circumstances.12
However, circumstances vary, and exigent circumstances may warrant a broader scope for the
agent’s construction of the principal’s instructions. For example, leaving the menagerie for a
military illustration, suppose a commanding officer tells his troops to patrol an area but to
avoid engagement with enemy troops and to take no prisoners. If the patrol encounters the
enemy’s general, unguarded, one might initially think that it is reasonable to capture the
general, given the overall objectives of armed combat.13 In some circumstances, that is, an
agent may reasonably believe that the need or opportunity to act to accomplish the principal’s
overriding objective should be understood to expand the agent’s authority. This can be a risky
choice for the agent because the principal may disagree after the fact with the agent’s
assessment of what the principal’s overriding objective required, or even what its nature might
have been. Moreover, the principal may have information the agent lacks and which the
principal has determined to withhold from the agent. In the military illustration, perhaps the
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Or the principal may acknowledge the inquiry but explicitly refuse to respond. See
Garriock v. Walker, 1 Rattie 100 (Sess. 1873).
12
For a related argument supporting a current-preferences default rule for statutory
interpretation, see Einer Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear
Legislation 45 (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press 2008).
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commanding officer knew that high-level peace negotiations were underway but did not tell the
patrol leader. Capturing the enemy general may destroy the peace negotiations and may also
prompt a court-martial, not a medal, for the patrol leader.
c.

Departures from instructions

Third, agents at times depart from instructions, well understanding what the principal
wished to be done under the immediate circumstances, because the agent believes that the
principal’s instruction was misguided. Returning to the menagerie example, suppose A
contracts to buy the horse from T, fully understanding P’s instruction as P meant it, but
believing it to be a mistake from the standpoint of the menagerie itself. What appears to be
hubris on A’s part could have several explanations. A may know from the experience of
working for P that P is given to issuing instructions that P later regrets if anyone acts on them.
After A ignores P’s instructions, P applauds A’s good judgment.14 It may, of course, be
difficult and hazardous for A to make an assessment of any particular instruction at the time A
acts. A risks ignoring instructions that P intends to be taken seriously, just as the patrol leader
in the military illustration risks taking action that is contrary to the organization’s objectives as
those in control understand them at the time.
Matters are more complicated when the principal is not an individual. Suppose that P is
not the owner of the menagerie but instead is the chief executive officer of Zoo, Inc., an
incorporated firm. P is A’s organizational superior but not A’s principal; the common law of
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I owe this example to Mel Eisenberg.
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agency treats both as co-agents of a common incorporated principal.15 A may contravene P’s
instruction because A believes it is an element of P’s cash-conservation strategy to enable Zoo,
Inc. to fund new business ventures believed by A to be unsound. Or P’s plan, as understood
by A, requires a shift out of horses and into exotic animals to be purchased at inflated prices
from P. In either case, by purchasing the horse A has contravened the instruction of A’s
organizational superior. Does A’s duty of loyalty to the interests of Zoo, Inc. justify A’s
actions? If A disagrees only with P’s business strategy, although it may be in A’s long-term
interest in organizational survival to dissent from P’s plan, A is not justified in buying the
horse. Zoo, Inc.’s organizational structure allocates authority to make business strategy
decisions—some of which likely will turn out to be mistaken—to P, not A. A may resign from
Zoo, Inc., or seek reassignment within it, or attempt to persuade P’s superiors to override P’s
prohibition, but if that course fails and A stays in place A should follow the directions of A’s
immediate superior. Other issues follow when P’s instruction is a component of what appears
to A to be a plan for self-dealing by P. There may be other avenues within Zoo, Inc. that A
should pursue, such as contacting its board of directors, its shareholders, or its general
counsel. Additionally, A’s justifications for ignoring P’s instruction may be more compelling
when P has directed A to do something as opposed to prohibiting an action.16 If A acts
affirmatively, as by purchasing exotic animals for Zoo, Inc. from P at prices A knows to be
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In doctrinal terms, a principal’s consistent practice of applauding an agent’s departures
from instructions may augment the agent’s actual authority through implication. Restatement
(Third) of Agency § 2.02, cmt. e.
15
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.04(9) & cmt. i.
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inflated, A appears to be aiding and abetting P’s breach of fiduciary duty.17 If A obeys P’s
instruction to refrain from taking an action, such as buying a horse, A is likely to be less
closely and necessarily connected to P’s breach of duty.
d.

Literal compliance

Before leaving this example of a categorical prohibition, consider whether acting on a
literal understanding of the prohibition would necessarily discharge A’s duty to P. Suppose that
A obeys P and buys no more horses for the menagerie. In A’s spare time, A develops a
specialized menagerie that displays only horses, having recognized that P’s menagerie may no
longer appeal to horse fans. Or A tips off P’s already-established competitor that P may be
abandoning horses. A’s literal adherence to P’s instruction does not privilege A to do other
things inconsistent with P’s interests that are related to the scope of A’s relationship with P.18
Additionally, A’s duty as an agent requires the disclosure to P of relevant information learned
while acting for P.19 If A learns that P’s competitor is developing a horse exhibit, A should
tell
P. In short, A’s literal compliance with P’s instruction does not obviate A’s fiduciary duties to
P. e.

16

Non-agency relationships

For starters, an agent is not obliged to follow an instruction to perform an illegal act.
See id § 8.09(2).
17
Knowingly to assist a fiduciary’s breach of the duty of loyalty is a tort. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 874, cmt. c & § 876 (b)(St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers
1979).
18
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.04 (agent who competes with principal or assists
principal’s competitor breaches duty of loyalty).
19
See, e.g., Evvtex Co. v. Hartley Cooper Assocs., Inc., 102 F.3d 1327, 1333 n. 7 (2d
Cir. 1996); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11.
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An agent’s duties to the principal contrast sharply with those owed by a person whose
relationship with the principal consists only of one or more bargained-for exchanges, whether
for goods, services, or other things of value. A is in this respect differently situated from T,
the third party dealer in horses encountered earlier. As P’s supplier of horses, T’s duty to P is
to provide the horses P purchases, with qualities as warranted by T. If their supply
relationship has had a long history, it may have contributed more to P’s success than has A.
But T, not having undertaken to act on P’s behalf, is free to do what A is not free to do as P’s
agent. Unless T has explicitly agreed not to do so, T may supply horses to P’s competitor and
may develop a competing menagerie. T owes no duty to P to reveal relevant information—
about P’s competitor, for example—unless withholding the information constitutes fraud.20
Likewise, if T is not a dealer in horses but a supplier of a service that P uses in the menagerie,
such as veterinarian, T is not P’s agent. T’s duty is to comply with the relevant standard of
care. If P relies on T’s advice and trusts T, P may attempt to establish that T should be treated
as a fiduciary, for example if P at T’s invitation relies on T’s professedly expert advice about
which animals to buy.21 Undisclosed self-dealing by T would then become problematic. In
contrast, A’s fiduciary duties do not turn on whether P is able to establish that P in fact trusted

20

For example, T must reveal nonobvious defects in the horses offered for sale to P that
concern facts basic to the transaction and disclosure is reasonably to be expected in the
circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(e)(St. Paul: American Law Institute
Publishers 1977).
21
On the imposition of duties of loyalty in relationships that are not canonically fiduciary,
see D. DeMott, ‘Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their
Consequences’, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 925 (2006).
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and relied upon A because agency doctrine operates categorically by treating all agents as
fiduciaries as to conduct within the scope of the relationship.
3.

Instructions That Explicitly Confer Discretion
a.

Discretionary authority

An instruction on its face may give an agent discretion to determine what to do. A
principal might so structure an initial grant of authority or an interim instruction for many
reasons. The principal may believe that the agent’s superior training will better situate the
agent to decide what to do at the relevant time.22 Separately, the principal may wish not to
hear from the agent again and may wish that the agent not seek clarifications. The principal
also may believe that, given the nature of the agent’s work, it will be impossible to articulate in
advance all contingencies that may occur and how they should be resolved. More concretely,
P, the menagerie owner, may tell A, its manager: “We need to enlarge the menagerie. I
authorize you to spend up to $100,000 on additional animals, as you see fit.” A then
purchases an assortment of elephants, giraffes, and cobras. Upon learning what A has done, P
reacts negatively. P first says, “But that assortment won’t draw crowds, in my judgment.” P,
however, has expressly allocated discretion to A to use A’s judgment, taking the risk that it
may not coincide with what P believes, after the fact, that P would have decided to do instead.
Alternatively, P reacts, “Cobras! You know I’ve always refused to exhibit snakes. Too
dangerous.” Although P’s statement on its face imposed only a monetary limit on A, A is not
free to disregard what A knows about P’s preferences, even if A believes them to be mistaken.
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But suppose A had no way of knowing about P’s aversion to snake exhibits. How widely the
menagerie industry shares P’s aversion is relevant to whether A acted reasonably. If P’s is a
general menagerie and only more specialized ones exhibit snakes (especially large and deadly
ones), it is not reasonable for A to believe that, without more, P authorized A so radically to
shift the nature of P’s business.
As discussed more fully below, a principal’s initial statement of authority to an agent is
subject to later countermand by the principal, as would occur if P, having earlier delegated
discretion to A to choose animals to purchase for the menagerie, issues later instructions that
limit A’s discretion or otherwise alter the circumstances under which A will perform. Suppose
that P initially assures A that A will not be required to travel overseas to make the purchases
but then later directs A to fly to Ruritania to purchase a rare specimen for P’s menagerie.
Unless P can be persuaded to withdraw the instruction, A has a choice: either comply with the
instruction, which may give A a claim against P for the increased cost of A’s performance; or
resign.23
b.

Discretion used to self-deal

The fiduciary benchmark disallows (unless the principal consents) interpretations possibly
motivated by the temptations of self-dealing. A may use part of the $100,000 to pay for a
giraffe, a satisfactory giraffe viewed objectively, but sourced from A’s personal collection of
exotic animals. Even if giraffes of the type have an ascertainable market price, and A pays no
more than that price, A’s self-dealing breaches the duty of loyalty that A owes to P unless A

22

K. Greenawalt, ‘From the Bottom Up’, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 994, 1020 (1997).
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discloses the material facts to P and P consents.24 Free to self-deal without disclosure and the
principal’s consent, A’s judgment as to the assortment of animals to purchase may be biased.25
Giraffes might then loom larger in the menagerie in more than one sense!
A’s breach of the duty of loyalty makes remedies available to P that go beyond
compensation for demonstrable loss. Suppose, reversing the example, that P directs A to raise
$100,000 by selling animals from the menagerie, and A purchases the giraffe for A’s own
collection without disclosing this fact to P. Even if A purchases at the then-current market
price, P is entitled if P wishes to recover the giraffe itself from A or, if A then resells the
giraffe at a higher price to T, to recover A’s profit. P may also take the position that A’s
undisclosed self-dealing forfeits A’s right to receive agreed-to compensation for A’s services.26
In all of these examples, it is beside the point that P’s statement did not specifically
prohibit A’s act. An agent’s fiduciary duty furnishes a benchmark for the agent’s
interpretation of the principal’s instructions and for assessing actions the agent takes in
response. This benchmark facilitates and simplifies the principal’s exercise of control; it
means that, to protect the principal’s interests, instructions and statements of authority in
agency relationships need not resemble trust indentures and other densely-drafted commercial
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Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, cmt. f(1) & illus. 3-4.
Id. § 8.03.
25
Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation at 220-221 (“Once an agent is encouraged at all to
further his own interests or those of worthwhile causes, so long as he does not harm his
principal’s interests, his judgment about what exactly what will satisfy his principal’s interests
may be skewed. He may convince himself, or hope he can convince others, that her interests
did not suffer.”).
26
Cameco Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783 (N.J. 1999). Further on remedies for breach,
see D. DeMott, ‘Disloyal Agents,’ 58 Ala. L. Rev. 1047 (2007).
24
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instruments. Absent the fiduciary benchmark, the principal would, like a good corporate
lawyer drafting a complex loan agreement on behalf of a lender, need to attempt to anticipate
contingencies and routes through which the agent might use discretion to the principal’s
disadvantage. Alternatively, a principal might reduce its use of agents27 or incur the costs of
insuring against agents’ decisions skewed by self-interest and other impermissible motivations.
Self-protective tactics are not free of transaction and opportunity costs and carry distinct
complications and limitations of their own.
Relatedly, some question why agency is a categorical instance of a fiduciary relationship,
even in commercial contexts, and whether or not the principal’s instructions explicitly confer
discretion on the agent. Linking the principal’s right and ability to control the agent to the
fiduciary benchmark imposed on the agent’s interpretation of statements of authority and of
interim instructions, answers the question. In our last example, if A is free to self-deal (by
purchasing) without disclosing that fact to P, A may select animals to sell on the basis of A’s
assessment of their potential for resale at prices higher than the then-current market value.
This prospect will affect how A interprets P’s instructions. If P tells A, “First sell the animals
that aren’t drawing the crowds,” A may well be tempted to press the definition of “crowd” so
as to dispose of the giraffe through self-dealing prior to the horse, if the horse’s market value
over time is more readily predictable than is that of the giraffe.

27

The principal’s plan may substitute technology for (human) agents or may reorganize its
operation to internalize functions performed by external agents on the theory that employees
are easier to monitor or less vulnerable to temptation.
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To be sure, an agreement between principal and agent may help establish that the parties
did not intend a relationship of agency or the scope of any such relationship.28 However, it
follows from the argument above that ex ante agreements between principal and agent in which
the principal agrees not to hold the agent to any duty of loyalty either are ineffective or create a
legal relationship other than agency. An agent’s representational capacity, necessarily tied to
the principal’s power to control the agent, is also necessarily tied to the interpretative
framework through which the agent determines actions to take on the principal’s behalf.29
c.

Well-motivated disregard of principal’s preferences

Additionally, an agent’s position as the principal’s representative calls into question
whether the agent may disregard known preferences of the principal when immaterial to the
principal’s economic interests and when the agent believes that acting on these preferences
would be misguided. Returning to the prior example, suppose that A, who cannot immediately
consult with P, knows that P has a slight preference that menagerie animals be sold to T, not
Z, when both P and Z are willing to pay the same price. P holds this preference for no stated
or tangible reason known to A, whether or not economic.30 A, however, prefers Z and sells to
Z, not because A will benefit personally, but because Z generously donates a portion of its

28

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02.
For recent recognition of the constitutive nature of an agent’s fiduciary duty and the
significance of the principal’s instructions, see Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 266667 (2013).
30
K. Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation, 228 n.14 (“tangible” interests encompass
economic interests as well as preferences known to be based on, for example, sympathy with a
particular third party).
29
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profits to the poor.31 On the one hand, as Kent Greenawalt notes, A has furthered P’s
objective—reducing the menagerie’s cohort of animals—and at no less economic benefit to P.32
On the other hand, as P’s agent, A acted as P’s representative, taking action in the world as if
P had done so personally, and from all A knows, A has reason to believe that P would have
sold to T, not Z. Thus, even well-motivated departures from P’s known preferences are
inconsistent with A’s position as P’s representative.
4.

The Tardy Instruction
a.

Delayed conferrals of authority

Should it matter what the agent believes the extent of authority to be at the time the agent
acts? Suppose P, who owns the copyright interests in books written by her late father, has
authorized A, a literary agent, to enter into contracts with publishers for her father’s nonfiction
works. Later on, P, pleased with the quality of A’s work, drafts a letter increasing A’s
authority to include contracts for her father’s novels. P mails the letter to A, but it does not
arrive before A executes a contract with T for publication of one of the novels.33 Is P bound to
T? Or is P free to contract with Z, a rival publisher, who offers better terms than T? There
are many possible explanations for A’s action. A may have failed to focus on or understand
the scope of authority granted by P, or A may have known that authority was lacking but
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Or perhaps A knows that Z minimizes the taxes it pays less aggressively than T.
K. Greenawalt, Legal Interpretation, 221 (approving of agent’s choice “so long as the
peripheral interest is a general good and not the agent’s own welfare or particular interests”).
33
For an illustration in a reported case, see Ruggles v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 114
N.Y. 415 (1889).
32
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hoped that P wouldn’t care if A got a good deal with T. Or A may not have wanted to reveal
to T that P granted only limited authority to A.
This example illustrates the importance of the prototype or theoretical construct used to
define and analyze authority. If authority is defined as a function of the ongoing relationship
between an agent and a principal that must reflect the agent’s reasonable understanding of the
principal’s present wishes, an agent may not contravene or exceed instructions even when the
agent’s action happens to coincide with further instructions that, unbeknownst to the agent,
conform the agent’s authority to the agent’s acts. It is irrelevant to the extent of A’s actual
authority that P would act grudgingly in objecting to A’s action; the letter when it arrived
establishes P’s willingness to be bound by just such an act by A. In contrast, if conferring
authority is like making a gift, it should not matter whether the conferee knows of the
conferral. The conferral, if provable, would be analogous to delivery in making a gift, so long
as the donor intended to make the gift.34 Authority would have an autonomous and continuing
existence of its own, separate or detached from the relationship between principal and agent.
Like a testamentary will, authority would be effective until the principal revoked it but its
existence would be detached from the ongoing relationship and communications between the
principal and the agent, and perhaps also from the state of facts known to the agent at the time
the agent acts.
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E. Allan Farnsworth, Changing Your Mind: The Law of Regretted Decisions 136 (New
Haven & London: Yale University Press 1998) (emphasizing importance of donor’s intention).
To complete the gift, the donee must accept it. Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and
Other Donative Transfers § 6.1(b).
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Although other doctrines—soon to be explored—may bind P (the copyright holder), A
lacked actual authority to do so because the basis for actual authority is the agent’s reasonable
understanding of what the principal wishes the agent to do.35 The common law does not define
authority as a thing that has existence separate from the principal’s manifestations to the agent
and the agent’s reasonable understanding of them. In the example, this understanding is
lacking because although P acted to enlarge A’s authority, P did so unbeknownst to A.36 The
common law diverges in this respect from civil-law systems, which separate questions going to
the agent-principal relationship from those concerning the agent’s authority to bind the
principal in transactions with third parties. For example, under the Louisiana civil code, a
principal may confer authority through a unilateral juridical act, addressed to either the agent
or the third party.37 An agent may thus have authority to act without consenting to the
conferral itself, which implies that the existence of authority is not dependent on the agent’s
knowledge of the principal’s conferral.
b.

Apparent authority

T might nonetheless be able to hold P on the basis that A acted with apparent authority by
showing that T reasonably believed A to be authorized, a belief traceable to a manifestation
made by P. If T succeeds on this ground, P has a claim against A to recover her loss of the
better terms offered by Z because an agent is liable to the principal for losses caused by the

35

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01.
Id. § 3.01, cmt. b, illus. 1. The same point underlies Restatement (Second) of Agency §
26, Illus. 1 (St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers 1958).
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agent’s failure to act only as directed.38 Apparent authority is crucial to explaining how the
world works, or, more precisely, how agency doctrine accommodates the need for stability in
transactions and third-party expectations. As the presence of actual authority depends on
events that are often observable only by the agent and the principal, it may be tempting to the
principal to deny the existence of actual authority when the principal regrets what the agent has
done.39 Additionally, the principal’s explicit imposition of limits on the agent’s authority may
be accompanied with a nudge and a wink, encouraging the agent to ignore a limit when the
agent can conclude a deal that seems advantageous, knowing that the principal has a defense if
the deal subsequently proves disadvantageous. That principals only infrequently sue agents—
especially employee agents—for overstepping their authority, may suggest that the presence of
actual authority often coincides with apparent authority.40 Apparent authority thus backstops
actual authority in circumstances when proving actual authority would likely elude a third
party.
Apparent authority resembles shadow boxing because its presence turns on what P has
caused T to believe about P’s relationship with A. Suppose T first approaches P about her
father’s novels and P responds, “Talk to A about any of my father’s books. I’m too busy to
deal with publishers.” By deflecting T’s inquiry and redirecting T to A, P may lead T
reasonably to believe that A’s authority encompasses, as P says, “any” of her father’s books.
Indeed, perhaps, at the time A executes the contract, T knows, but A does not, that P has
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Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09, cmt. b.
For further elaboration, see id. § 2.03, cmt. c.
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written and mailed a letter expanding A’s authority to encompass what A is about to do.
Unless T knows that A executed the contract unaware of the letter, it is reasonable for T to
believe that P has authorized A to make the contract for the novel. In contrast, if T knows that
A does not know the content of the letter, T has at least reason to suspect that A lacks actual
authority. But T may nonetheless reasonably believe that P has also communicated less
formally with A. Otherwise, T would not reasonably believe that A has actual authority. Nor
would T be reasonable in believing that A acts with actual authority when T has reason to
know that A’s conduct breaches a fiduciary duty to P, as when T bribes A to induce A to deal
with T.41
c.

Ratification

In contrast, ratification is a consequence of a principal’s decision to affirm what the agent
has done, after the principal learns the facts.42 Although ratification has the effect of creating
actual authority after the fact,43 it does not require an instruction from the principal that
precedes the agent’s action. Accordingly ratification operates differently from actual authority.
Suppose P first learns about the contract from T and responds to T, “That’s what I’ve always
liked about A —the ability to take initiative to make a good deal.” P is bound because P has
affirmed or accepted A’s action. That P communicates with T, not A, does not matter because
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For other possible explanations, see G. Schwartz, ‘The Hidden and Fundamental Issue
of Employer Vicarious Liability,’ 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1739, 1764-1767 (1996).
41
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03, cmt. d. & § 8.02 (agent has duty not to acquire
material benefit from a third party through the agent’s use of position).
42
Id. § 4.01.
43
Id. § 4.02.
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events have moved beyond P’s statement of instructions to A.44

But may P both affirm the

contract with T and treat A’s unauthorized action as a breach of duty by A? P may wish to
affirm the contract to stay on good terms with T,45 but P may also wish to sue A to recover for
her loss of a better deal or to treat A’s conduct as a breach that should reduce A’s
compensation. As to A, P has given no assurances or representations that would estop P from
asserting such claims against A. P did nothing to induce A to execute the unauthorized
contract binding P to T, nor did their relationship place A in a situation in which executing the
contract appeared reasonably necessary to protecting P’s interests. Nonetheless, P seems to be
behaving badly. Given P’s manifest willingness to confer fuller authority on A, it is
opportunistic for P to assert A’s lack of actual authority because P could have gotten a better
deal from Z, the rival publisher. Generally, agency doctrine protects an agent against the
prospect that a principal may use its unilateral power to ratify as a way of shifting risk on to
the agent. Otherwise, a principal might be tempted to ratify an unauthorized transaction,
thereby binding the third party, while determining later whether to hold the agent accountable
if the transaction with the third party turns out to be one that the principal then regrets.46 If,
however, the agent’s unauthorized action places the principal in a predicament requiring that
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P’s attempt to ratify will be ineffective if it is preceded by any manifestation by T of
withdrawal, that is, of intention not to be bound by the transaction. Id. § 4.05 (1). Once P
repudiates A’s action, T should not be subject to the risk of P’s subsequent ratification.
Farnsworth, Changing Your Mind, 177.
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See Goldstick v. ICM Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01, cmt. b.
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the principal take affirmative steps to avoid loss, those steps do not manifest consent by the
principal effective to exonerate the agent.47
5.

The Countermanding or Final Instruction
Agency is a fragile legal institution because actual authority terminates whenever the

principal or the agent manifests to the other the wish to discontinue.48 Even when principal
and the agent have agreed that the agent’s authority is irrevocable, it is not,49 subject to two
general exceptions. The first reflects a lessening of the theoretical rigors of historical
formulations of agency doctrine to further widely-acknowledged social needs. Contemporary
agency doctrine permits a principal to grant authority irrevocably through a durable power of
attorney that becomes irrevocable when the principal loses legal capacity and regardless of that
loss.50 Although a principal who lacks legal capacity may well be unable to provide instructions
to the agent that would reflect the principal’s wishes, were the principal still legally competent,
contemporary agency doctrine respects the principal’s designation of a representative made
while still competent. The second exception recognizes that the power to affect a person’s legal
relationships may be granted irrevocably when the grant supports an interest of the agent’s that
is separate from, or independent of, the agency relationship itself, as illustrated below.
a.

47

Countermanding instructions

Id. § 4.02(2)(b) & cmt. d.
Id. § 3.10.
49
See F. Reynolds,’ When Is an Agent’s Authority Irrevocable,’ in Making Commercial
Law 259 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997)(Ross Cranston ed.)
50
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.08(2).
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These exceptions aside, the relative fragility of authority can seem puzzling because it
limits a principal’s ability to self- bind against the risk of future changes in the principal’s own
preferences. Derek Parfit’s example, “The Nineteenth Century Russian,” is instructive on
instructions that countermand prior instructions: a Russian nobleman, knowing he will inherit
large estates in the future, is prompted by his socialist ideals to form the intention “now, to
give the land to the peasants.”51 Knowing also
that in time his ideals may fade, ... he signs a legal document, which will automatically
give away the land, and which can be revoked only with his wife’s consent. He then says
to his wife, ‘Promise me that, if I ever change my mind, and ask you to revoke this
document, you will not consent.52
In the future, Parfit comments, the nobleman’s wife “might plausibly regard herself as not
released from her commitment,” viewing herself as having “obligations to two different
people;”53 she would betray the young man to whom she made the promise to obey the man to
whom she was (now) married, the later self of the young man. But, Parfit continues, if in
sound mind, “the person to whom we are committed can always release us.”54 Treating the
Russian Nobleman’s wife as his agent, the fiduciary benchmark requires action consistent with
her understanding of her principal’s present statement of intentions. Although his preferences
have changed, the principal’s identity and his wife is the Russian Nobleman’s representative.
The Russian Nobleman’s situation strikes some commentators as paradoxically self-
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Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 327 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984).
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Id.
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Id. at 328. Parfit continues, “This is like a similar fact about authority. Suppose that a
general tells his troops, ‘I order you to attack at dawn, and to disregard any later contrary
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frustrating.55 But his situation is troubling only if there’s good reason always to prefer one’s
present projects and wishes over those one may have in the future.56 Moreover, once he has
aged, the Russian Nobleman may understand his youthful fear of middle-aged degeneration to
have been only a jejune expression of naieveté.57 To be sure, his present (middle-aged)
perspective may diverge from that of his wife; and the power to revoke that vindicates his
autonomy may also be the instrument of her disillusionment with the man to whom she is
(now) married.58
A principal’s power to countermand a prior instruction is not the sole consequence of
agency’s foregrounding of the principal’s present preferences and assessments. Recall that ex
ante agreements that relieve an agent of fiduciary duties are, in the context of agency
relationships, ineffective. However, conduct by an agent that would breach the agent’s duty of
loyalty does not constitute a breach if the principal consents to it, effective consent requiring a
present decision by the principal preceded by disclosure by the agent of material facts relevant

order.’ He later says, “Disregard my last order and retreat.’ Despite the content of the first
order, it would be this second order that his troops should obey.” Id.
55
Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 152
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, rev. ed. 1984). As Elster defines
paradox, “status X gives you the right to status Z, on the condition that you perform action Y,
which automatically disqualifies you from being X.” Id. The Russian Nobleman is “setting
himself up for a situation in which he cannot make a certain request without ceasing to be
himself and thus losing all grounds for being obeyed.” Id.
56
B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality,’ The Identities of Persons 197, 206 (A.
Rorty ed. 1976)(Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press).
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Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality,’ 206.
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Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 328-29 (“That the young man whom she loved and
married has, in a sense, ceased to exist—that her middle-aged and cynical husband is at most
the later self of this young man—these claims seem to her to express more of the truth than the
simple claim, ‘they are the same person’.”).
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to the principal’s judgment.59 That is, whether “consent” is effective turns on the principal’s
present decision, informed by presently-disclosed information, and not the principal’s prior
assessments.
b.

Final instructions

A principal’s termination of authority is the principal’s final instruction to the agent
because it directs that agent cease acting on the principal’s behalf. If the agent continues
service thereafter, the agent is not entitled to compensation for the post-termination service in
most instances. Persisting after the final instruction is not, however, treated as a breach of the
agent’s duty of loyalty that could forfeit the agent’s right to compensation for prior service
because the agent has been disobedient, not disloyal.60 Agency doctrine gives effect to the
principal’s instruction even when it contravenes an agreement stating that the authority shall be
irrevocable, an objective the (young) Russian Nobleman attempted but failed to achieve.
Moreover, a principal has the power to revoke even when exercising the power
constitutes a breach of contract. Consider first the distinctive significance of the principal’s
power to revoke authority, returning to the hypothetical menagerie owner, P. Suppose P
retains A Corp. to manage P’s menagerie business. A Corp. specializes in managing zoos and
amusement parks more generally; properties it manages usually make prominent mention of A
Corp.’s involvement. The management agreement between P and A Corp. provides that, in
exchange for licensing the use of its name by P’s menagerie (which becomes “P’s Menagerie.
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An A Corp. Park”) and using its specialized management expertise, A Corp. will receive a
royalty of 3% of the menagerie’s gross revenues for the first 5 years, followed by a 5% royalty
over the next 5 years. The agreement explicitly provides that P agrees not to terminate prior to
the conclusion of 10 years, in exchange for A Corp.’s agreement to accept a lower royalty rate
over the first 5 years.61 Notwithstanding these terms, if P revokes A Corp.’s authority at the
five-year point, or indeed at any time, A Corp. may not remain in control of P’s menagerie. If
it does not depart voluntarily, A Corp. may be judicially ejected. Although A Corp. may sue P
to recover damages for breach of contract, A Corp. will need to prove and quantify its losses.62
P’s power to revoke A Corp.’s authority is not ousted by A’s prior agreement with A Corp.,
just as the Russian Nobleman’s prior instruction to his wife did not cancel his ongoing ability
to reconsider in light of his (later) preferences.
In contrast, irrevocability is achievable when authority supports an interest of the agent
that is distinct from the agency relationship, which A Corp.’s interest in recovering the higher
royalty rate over the final five years of its management agreement with P would not be. But
suppose that P and A Corp. agree that A Corp. will make substantial physical improvements to
the menagerie and will in exchange become a half-owner of the property. A Corp. now has an
interest separate from its interest in continuing to manage the menagerie, as A Corp. would
also have if it lends P P the money necessary to improve the menagerie, or if it leases the
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For the specifics, see Government Guaranty Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291 (3d Cir.
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62
In Maryland, industry-specific exceptions (hotels and retirement communities) oust the
application of common-law doctrine when an operating agreement does not permit early
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menagerie from P. A Corp.’s interest as a half-owner, a creditor, or a lessee is distinguishable
from its role as an agent.63 A Corp.’s distinct interest is enforceable; it also creates a nonagency basis on which to make irrevocable (if the parties’ agreement so provides) A Corp’s
management authority, trumping P’s terminal instruction by situating a portion of A Corp.’s
relationship with P beyond the scope of its representation of P.
The principal’s ongoing power to give the final instruction to an actor who is simply an
agent is an aspect of agency doctrine with wide-reaching consequences. For example, a
principal’s power to revoke authority helps explain why it is important that a corporation be a
legal person distinct from its organizers and its stockholders, although some contemporary
theorizing about corporate law appears to assume otherwise.64 To characterize a corporation as
simply a contractually-constituted association, in which directors and officers are the
shareholders’ agents, overlooks the fact that it is often to the advantage of shareholders that
directors and officers be able to create contractual commitments with third parties that bind
both the corporation and the third party. But if the shareholders are, individually, the
principals, each may revoke authority and do so at any time.65 This contingency renders
unstable the contracting capacity of directors and officers such that, at a minimum, a third
party would always want to know, immediately prior to executing a contract, whether all

termination. See Md. Com. Law Code § 23-104 (2004) & 23-102 (b)(specific performance
available as remedy) (2004).
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shareholders still assent to their purported representative’s authority. The corporate structure
overcomes this problem by situating authority between the corporation itself and those who act
on its behalf, and not between those agents and the shareholders.66
More generally, as a principal’s ongoing power to revoke an agent’s authority illustrates,
agency doctrine consistently privileges the principal’s present preferences, which may be
expressly stated (as when the principal revokes the agent’s authority) or bind the agent when
the agent interprets the principal’s instructions in light of the principal’s present wishes as the
agent then reasonably understands them. Viewed instrumentally, this underlying characteristic
of agency doctrine reduces the risks inherent in extending one’s legal personality by consenting
to representation by an agent. Viewed as a consequence of the constitutive elements of an
agency relationship, it is consistent with the relational nature of agency itself that agency
doctrine mandates loyalty to the principal’s present preferences (or persona). A principal’s
conferral of authority on an agent is unlike making a gift, executing a will, forming a
corporation, or authoring a work of literary or artistic art. All of these create a legally-salient
something that is external to or detached from their creator, whereas an agency relationship
remains an extension of the principal throughout its duration.
6.

Other Accounts of Agency Doctrine
The central importance of stating and acting upon instructions explains and links elements

of common-law agency doctrine that otherwise lack a single coherent rationale, in particular
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the agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal and the principal’s power to control the agent.67
Some commentators, most prominently Oliver Wendell Holmes, have doubted whether the
common law of agency has any ascertainable intellectual coherence. Justice Holmes asserted
that “there is no adequate and complete explanation of the modern law, except by the survival
in practice of rules which lost their true meaning,” which left, as an unsatisfying residue, only
a fictional identification of the agent and the principal, plus common sense.68 Holmes’s
pervasive pessimism aside, accounts of agency that slight or ignore the importance of
instructions are incomplete. For example, Wesley Hohfeld emphasized an agent’s power to
create legal liabilities in the principal that are correlatives of the legal power the principal has
granted to the agent. The agent’s powers, he concluded, are “[e]ssentially similar to...powers
of appointment in relation to property interests,” as are a sheriff’s power to sell property under
a writ of execution and a donor’s power to revoke a gift that has been promised but not
delivered.

69

Focusing exclusively on an agent’s ability to affect the principal’s legal interests,

Hohfeld’s account omits the agent’s duties to act loyally on behalf of the principal and as the
principal directs and, like civilian treatments of authority, decouples the presence of authority
from the agent’s duties to the principal. Hohfeld’s account also has implications for how an
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agent should interpret instructions received from the principal. If an agent’s authority is
comparable to a power of appointment in relation to a property interest, the text in or through
which authority is expressed would govern, not the agent’s understanding of the principal’s
wishes at the time the agent takes action. The absence of comparable formal requisites70 for
the creation of agency relationships would be a source of frustration, as would be the absence
in many agency relationships of anything comparable to a written power.
Other accounts attempt to capture agency relationships for the turf of bargained-for
exchange (in which many agency relationships unquestionably originate) and for the legal
domain of contract. James Coleman analyzed agency relationships as the consequence of
transactions involving an agent’s surrender of the right to control her own actions in exchange
for remuneration from a principal who needs the actions of one with the agent’s skills or
capacities.71 The principal’s dilemma is that “even a directly supervised agent may devote
more or less effort toward the outcome desired by the principal.”72 An agent’s interests are
always disjoint from the principal’s, not unified, and an agent always by definition acts
differently than would the principal in the agent’s place and with the agent’s resources.
Although Coleman’s account explores structures through which an agent may be led to identify
with the principal’s interests, it does not delve into the nature of direction, supervision, or
authority, all highly significant to the functioning of agency relationships. Authority to direct
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the actions of others is essential to explaining how organized activity occurs because such
authority supersedes moment-by-moment negotiation over the terms on which work will be
done and by whom.73 Direction or supervision requires instruction, and by consenting to an
agency relationship with a principal, the agent becomes subject to a duty to follow instructions
furnished by the principal that are within the broad outer limits imposed by the law. Acting on
the basis of those instructions requires interpretation by the agent, a process anchored by the
agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal, which bridges the agent’s interests with those of the
principal. But this is not the realm of contractual interpretation, necessarily focused as it is on
mutually-understood intentions at the time the contract was made and permitting otherwiselegal actions in disregard of the counterparty’s interests.74 Contractual interpretation, as Daniel
Markovits notes, which “takes the terms of the contract as its lodestar,” requires that a
promisor look not to the promisee’s changing interests but to the contract .75 Agency doctrine,
in contrast, focuses an agent’s interpretation on the principal’s expressed or cognizable wishes
at the time the agent determines how to act.
7.

Conclusion
The fiduciary character of an agent’s position explains a principal’s exercise of control

over the agent through instructions given to the agent, as well as the adaptability of agency
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relationships across changing circumstances. The fiduciary character of the agent’s position
stems from an agent’s position as a legally-salient extension or representative of the principal,
as does agency’s consistent requirement of loyalty to a principal’s present preferences and
persona. In striking contrast to other bodies of legal doctrine, agency law is not a basis on
which to ground a solution to one’s distrust of one’s future self, focused as agency necessarily
is on assuring a principal’s autonomy through time and thus on the principal’s present self and
preferences.

75

Daniel Markovits, ‘Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of

35

Fiduciary Relations’, [this volume, draft at 7]

